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Foreword 
Government Ethics and Bailouts: The 
Past, Present, and Future 
Nicole Elsasser Watson∗ 
In 2008, the United States experienced a catastrophic fi-
nancial crisis—and, some might say, a financial panic—to a 
scale trumped only by the Great Depression.1 The federal gov-
ernment responded by passing the Emergency Economic Stabi-
lization Act of 20082 that created the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP),3 bailing out several of the country’s largest 
financial services companies. These responsive efforts were 
paradoxically rebuked as an inappropriate use of taxpayer dol-
lars and hailed as curbing the tailspin of our financial system 
and economy.4 The government’s efforts to resolve the lingering 
and devastating effects of the 2008 financial crisis, however, 
did not end with the bailout. In the wake of public outrage—
fueled by reports of bailed-out Wall Street companies paying 
 
∗  Symposium Articles Editor, Volume 95, Minnesota Law Review. I 
humbly offer my sincere gratitude to Volume 95 Editor-in-Chief Reed Schu-
ster, Dean David Wippman, and Professors Prentiss Cox, Claire Hill, Brett 
McDonnell, and Richard Painter for all of their contributions and efforts to-
ward making the 2010 Symposium a dynamic success. In addition, I salute the 
entire Board and Staff of the Law Review for making the Symposium and pub-
lication of these articles possible. Finally, I extend my thanks to Stephen, for 
his unwavering encouragement and refractive perspective. Copyright © 2011 
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 1. See Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ’30s, with No End Yet in 
Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB122169431617549947.html. 
 2. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
122 Stat. 3765. 
 3. Id. § 101(a)(1). 
 4. Compare Gretchen Morgenson, A.I.G.’s Bailout Priorities Are in Crit-
ics’ Cross Hairs: Covering Foreign Institutions Further Upsets Some in U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 5102057 (reporting 
critiques of the government’s generosity to financial institutions vis-à-vis tax-
payers), with Peter S. Goodman, But Will It All Work?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 17941937 (describing the bailout as a 
rescue effort). 
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their executives lavish bonuses at a time when the American 
public was being smothered by joblessness5—Congress passed 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,6 impos-
ing restrictive rules on TARP recipients, and the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank)7 in 2010. Spanning over 2300 pages, Dodd-Frank is an 
extensive piece of legislation that tackles issues ranging from 
executive compensation to shareholder access and beyond. Still, 
as 2010 rolled on, economists warned that economic recovery in 
the United States was losing steam and that a double-dip re-
cession was on our horizon.8 Public angst over mounting na-
tional debt and waning economic recovery spurred the Obama 
Administration to announce a two-year civilian federal em-
ployee pay freeze in late 2010,9 and a partisan impasse in 
budget negotiations threatened a federal government shutdown 
in 2011.10 Thus, despite unprecedented legal responses to ques-
tions about our economic stability and ethical obligations in the 
face of crisis, these issues continue to plague our present and 
will remain relevant in the future.  
The 2010 Government Ethics and Bailouts Symposium 
sought to bring together internationally renowned speakers, 
leading scholars, and esteemed civil servants to discuss the 
most apropos topics at the intersection of ethics and bailouts. 
Specifically, the Symposium deliberated (1) the question of 
whether capitalism failed, (2) ethical considerations revolving 
around government bailouts, and (3) long-term ramifications of 
government bailouts. Panelists were selected by the Law Re-
view Staff with thoughtful input from our distinguished and 
 
 5. See Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses After 
$170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 
4926991; Peter S. Goodman, Economists Scan Jobs Data, Seeking Signs of 
Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 22302516.  
 6. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 115. 
 7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 8. See Erin Ailworth, Economy Slows; A 2d Slump is Feared: Fed Chair-
man Vows a Vigorous Response, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 28, 2010, at 1, available at 
2010 WLNR 17144768; Jeff Sommer, Double Dip? A Tipping Point May Be 
Near, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at BU4, available at 2010 WLNR 16235864. 
 9. See Peter Baker & Jackie Calmes, Obama Declares Two-Year Freeze 
on Federal Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 
23765163. 
 10. See Carl Hulse, Budget Impasse Increasing Risk of U.S. Shutdown, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 5895283. 
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ever-supportive faculty. Each panel was designed to demon-
strate diversity of ideas, expertise, and geography. After 
months of preparation, the Symposium included a vibrant pre-
Symposium address by former Vice President Walter F. Mon-
dale, an insightful cornerstone keynote address by Commis-
sioner Troy A. Paredes of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and three distinguished panels: The Past: 
Did Capitalism Fail?, The Present: The Ethics of Government 
Bailouts of Private Industry in a Free Market System, and The 
Future: Long-Term Ramifications of Government Bailouts. 
Former Vice President Mondale provided a pre-Symposium 
welcoming address to panelists, faculty, members of the Law 
Review Board and Staff, and other distinguished guests. Vice 
President Mondale noted that the 2008 financial crisis and en-
suing government response highlighted the critical importance 
of ethics and transparency in government on both sides of the 
political aisle. 
In the Symposium’s keynote address, SEC Commissioner 
Paredes engaged panelists and attendees, underscoring the 
SEC’s formidable regulatory task of deciding what to permit, 
prohibit, and mandate during this historic time. The Commis-
sioner posited that an important bottom line question coming 
out of the financial crisis is: What makes an effective board of 
directors and, more specifically, what makes an effective inde-
pendent director? Symposium panelists, employing various ap-
proaches and making distinct conclusions, further called atten-
tion to regulatory and practical questions coming out of the 
financial crisis.  
The Past: Did Capitalism Fail?, the Symposium’s first pan-
el, inspired by Judge Richard Posner’s A Failure of Capitalism: 
The Crisis of ’08 and the Descent into Depression,11 challenged 
panelists to unpack lingering questions about capitalism in 
light of the financial crisis. Professor William Black of the Uni-
versity of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law boldly accepted 
that challenge and concluded that capitalism is criminogenic 
and that its supporting theoclassical economics dogma failed. 
Black defined criminogenic environments as those that create 
strong, perverse incentives to act criminally and addressed why 
finance is particularly vulnerable to, and has become increas-
ingly, criminogenic. Black suggested examples of capitalism’s 
criminal incentives include executive and professional compen-
 
 11. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 
AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).  
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sation as well as an ideological hostility toward regulation. 
Furthermore, Black insisted that theoclassical economics failed 
in that it ignored economic fraud theories, such as lemons and 
moral hazard.  
Professor Jeffrey Lipshaw of the Suffolk University Law 
School answered the question of whether capitalism failed dif-
ferently—he chose to probe the syntax and semantics of the 
question itself. Rather than assessing the merits of modern 
global financial systems, Lipshaw assessed how those without 
financial expertise make sense of catastrophes like the finan-
cial crisis. Concluding that capitalism didn’t fail, but the meta-
phors got a “C,” Lipshaw posited that the verb construction of 
the question “did capitalism fail?” is ambiguous and leads to 
differing explanatory metaphors about cause and effect in the 
financial crisis. Lipshaw, in turn, challenged those metaphors.  
Former SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins began our second 
panel, The Present: The Ethics of Government Bailouts of Pri-
vate Industry in a Free Market System. Atkins highlighted the 
benefits of hindsight in the financial crisis and advocated for 
transparency as a fundamental regulatory principle. Jonathan 
Katz, former SEC Secretary, analyzed who really benefitted 
from the bailout. Katz tracked the government’s actions during 
the financial crisis, beginning with the collapse of Bear 
Stearns, and then assessed governmental interventions 
through both TARP and non-TARP funding. Katz argued that 
TARP was merely one component of a much larger governmen-
tal intervention remarkably similar to governmental responses 
to past banking failures. Noting fundamental changes in the 
banking business model and significant industry consolidation, 
Katz predicted that future bank failures are inevitable. Con-
cluding that some discrete creditors and banks on the verge of 
failure benefited from the bailout, Katz expressed doubt about 
whether the bailout addressed underlying and reoccurring 
problems in our nation’s financial system. While acknowledging 
that Dodd-Frank provides regulators with greatly expanded 
authority, Katz cautioned that it remains uncertain how this 
power will be used.  
Professor Kathleen Clark of Washington University in St. 
Louis School of Law unpacked what the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury got right and wrong in TARP, specifically with re-
spect to fiduciary-based standards for bailout contractors. 
Clark acknowledged the government’s legitimate reasons for 
outsourcing some services to contractors, including its reliance 
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on contractors in connection with the bailout, but suggested 
that the government’s decision to impose fiduciary-based ethics 
restrictions on outsiders implementing TARP was unusual and 
may have been unwise in some respects. Specifically, Clark 
cautioned that the costs involved in implementing an expanded 
financial disclosure regime and the First Amendment concerns 
raised by an imposition of prepublication review should be ex-
amined more closely before the government expands these ap-
proaches to protecting the public trust. 
Taking a different approach, Professors Claire Hill and Ri-
chard Painter of the University of Minnesota Law School fo-
cused their analysis on how conflicts of interest erode personal 
responsibility in government and banking. Hill and Painter as-
serted that government involvement in business as regulator—
and sometimes manager—is an inevitable reality, but imported 
that conflicts of interest is one critical reason why government 
might perform these functions poorly. Hill and Painter high-
lighted how some conflicts of interest are particularly difficult 
to regulate, such as when a government or corporate official 
seeks to advance interests incongruent with those he or she is 
supposed to be advancing. Beyond promoting an ethos of per-
sonal and professional responsibility of business and govern-
ment decisionmakers, Hill and Painter further suggested that 
imposing some degree of personal liability in the business 
sphere and commensurate measures of accountability in gov-
ernment may be an important step toward greater responsibili-
ty. Hill and Painter also opined that strengthening alternative 
voices in the decisionmaking process, reducing decisionmakers’ 
exposure to the most potent sources of conflicting interest, and 
increasing transparency in both business and government 
should help shore up these problems.  
Finally, in our third panel, The Future: Long-Term Ramifi-
cations of Government Bailouts, Professor Lisa Fairfax of 
George Washington University Law School reconciled govern-
ment bailouts, corporate governance, and directors’ fiduciary 
duties. Specifically, Fairfax discussed how the wave of govern-
mental reforms following the financial crisis intruded on board 
functions and responsibilities, dramatically enhancing board 
duties. Fairfax cautioned that reforms failed to fully address 
the limitations associated with board functions and fiduciary 
duties, thus hampering the board’s ability to effectively fulfill 
those tasks without creating an effective mechanism for ensur-
ing that boards are held accountable for failing to perform their 
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new tasks. While convinced that a more robust discussion of 
boards and their role in the modern corporation is necessary, 
Fairfax was skeptical about the federal government’s ability to 
fully engage in such a discussion. 
Professor Steven Davidoff of the University of Connecticut 
School of Law focused his analysis on the terms and experience 
of the federal government’s private ownership during the fi-
nancial crisis. Davidoff posited that potential losses on the gov-
ernment’s corporate investments—both in the aggregate and 
individually—pale in comparison to the avoided costs of a more 
significant economic downturn and financial panic. Still, Davi-
doff critiqued the government’s failure to negotiate financial 
and governance structures that were in its best interest, such 
as legal, economic, and time limitations. Anticipating future, 
though rare, instances of government corporate ownership, Da-
vidoff presented principles to guide the structure, monitoring, 
and retention of government investment in private enterprise.  
Professor Stephen Bainbridge of the UCLA School of Law 
criticized the government’s enactment of Dodd-Frank. In par-
lance coined by Roberta Romano,12 Bainbridge argued that 
Dodd-Frank’s six key corporate governance provisions 
represent “quack federal corporate governance.” Specifically, 
Bainbridge asserted that Dodd-Frank lacks strong empirical or 
theoretical justification and was enacted via a hijacked legisla-
tive process aimed at achieving policy goals essentially unre-
lated to the causes or consequences of the financial crisis. 
Bainbridge discussed how Dodd-Frank’s corporate governance 
provisions erode the system of competitive federalism—the 
unique genius of American corporate law—by displacing state 
regulation with federal law. Bainbridge concluded that Dodd-
Frank represents the continued federalization of corporate gov-
ernance that has become a default response whenever the fed-
eral government is moved to action by a new economic crisis.  
Although unable to attend the Symposium, Professor Usha 
Rodrigues of the University of Georgia School of Law similarly 
argued in her contribution to this issue that Dodd-Frank re-
forms are flawed and misguided. Rodrigues noted that ideally, 
long-term investors—with the motivation to watch closely—
should monitor public corporations, but too often investors in-
stead respond to short-term incentives. Rodrigues further dis-
cussed how regulatory responses to the bailout utilized long-
 
 12. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
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term investor tools like shareholder empowerment, disclosure, 
and independence, without acknowledging that rational share-
holders often focus on diversification of their assets, which ne-
gates incentives to use shareholder empowerment tools. In-
stead, Rodrigues proposed carefully chosen forms of 
substantive governmental regulation or restructuring the law 
to realign the incentives of institutional investors with those of 
long-term shareholders. 
The articles contained in this issue demonstrate the panel-
ists’ attempt to address concerns that cut across multiple areas 
of financial crises and regulation: capitalism, ethics, and long-
term ramifications of government bailouts. It is the Minnesota 
Law Review’s desire that this symposium discussion will fuel 
evolution of the law in the government ethics and bailouts con-
text. 
